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Book Reviews 
MURRAY CLARK HAVENS, EDITOR 
An Introduction to Metapolitics: A Brief Inquiry into the Concep- 
tual Language of Political Science. By A. JAMES GREGOR. 
(New York: Free Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 403. $9.95.) 
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenol- 
ogy: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. By 
EDMUND HUSSERL. Translated, with an Introduction, by DAVID 
CARR. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Pp. 
xliii, 405. $12.95.) 
This review essay treats two quite different sorts of books together 
in an attempt to clarify the place of methodology in contemporary 
political science. In the course of a review of the books in question, 
I shall discuss themes common to both works: crisis, science, philos- 
ophy and methodology. 
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I. The Crisis of the Scientific State 
If a state is in crisis, then knowledge as it is embodied in, or rep- 
resented by, that state may in consequence also be in crisis; or, if 
an organized system or tradition of knowledge is in crisis, then the 
state which represents or interprets itself in terms of that organized 
system of knowledge may in consequence also be in crisis. It is ex- 
tremely difficult to find an unprejudiced, workable perspective on 
the situation, especially if crisis conditions obtain. A perspective 
which represents itself in a crisis to be a reliable one also seems to 
implv that. in some respect. there really is no crisis. 
Gregor's book, An Introduction to Metapolitics, begins with the 
observation that "the study of politics has entered into crisis," along 
with "a variety of disciplines [which evince] the same syndrome of 
pathic traits." "Metapolitics" is the reliable perspective on the 
crisis, which (as we have seen) means that from the preferred per- 
spective. there really is no crisis: "The principal contention of this 
book will be, implicitly, that once certain critical concepts are at 
least moderately well characterized, most of the putative issues di- 
viding parties in the exacerbated debate dissipate themselves; they 
are in a real sense 'pseudo-problems,' the consequence of linguistic, 
analytic, conceptual, and procedural confusions." The appearance 
of crisis-the "pseudo-problems"-is seen to be in part the con- 
comitant of an alterable state of affairs, and in part the consequence 
of a relatively recent historical development. Gregor is "convinced 
that political science is an informal discipline," and that in it "politi- 
cal inquiry is pursued, by and large, with the analytic and logical 
machinery of ordinary language," a condition which persists in the 
absence of "sustained effort .., to standardize linguistic usage or 
systematize theoretical procedures." Moreover, Gregor sees the 
twentieth century "behavioral revolution" in political science as 
having upset an "untroubled past" in which "political 'scientists' 
were conceived to be essentially, if not exclusively, practicing 
moralists issuing appraisive assessments and prescriptive advice." 
But even the practice of a scientific political science leaves much 
confusion, for in political science "at its best," undergraduates take 
"a rag-bag" of courses and graduate students remain "innocent of 
any systematic awareness of a community of concerns that sustains 
political inquiry as a discipline." 
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For Gregor, the study of political science is in crisis, but the larger 
intellectual context is conducive to effective therapy: We live in the 
"age of analysis," and metapolitics-"metalinguistic talk about the 
analytic, synthetic, and normative language of political inquiry and 
politics itself"-can, if pursued, be expected to rectify our crisis, 
mainly by clarifyina for us the procedures of science: "What has 
been argued is that science is a unique cognitive activity; it is the 
most reliable method for warranting both empirical and formal truth 
claims." 
Edmund Husserl's last great work, The Crisis of European Sci- 
ences, was presented in lectures and published installments (in 
German) during the 1930s. Now it is published in English, and 
we see that for Husserl the crisis is not confined to a few transitional 
disciplines: 
A crisis of our sciences as such: can we seriously speak of it? Is not this 
talk ... an exaggeration? After all, the crisis of a science indicates nothing 
less than that its genuine scientific character, the whole manner in which it 
has set its task and developed a methodology for it, has become question- 
able. This may be true of philosophy... [and psychology]. But how could 
we speak ... seriously of a crisis of the sciences in general-that is, also of 
the positive sciences, including pure mathematics and the exact natural sci- 
ences, which we can never cease to admire as models of rigorous and highly 
successful scientific discipline? 
It is plain that Husserl understands-and wishes to be quite clear 
about-the radical character of his claim, representing as it does a 
crisis of enormous, virtually all-encompassing scope. "All-encom- 
passing," that is, from the point of view of European humanity 
(which Husserl construes to include, e.g., England and the United 
States), which finds a world constructed and interpreted in light of 
and partlv in terms of scientific achievements. How is it possible to 
find a reliable perspective in such a situation? First, Husserl under- 
stands the meaning of modem philosophy ("from within") from 
Descartes to the present in terms of the "true struggles of our time," 
namely, "struggles between humanity which has already collapsed 
and humanity which has its roots but is struggling to keep them or 
find new ones." The crisis of science is the loss of its meaning for 
life-a consequence, paradoxically enough, of its own achievements. 
For philosophers (in this perspective, "functionaries of mankind"), 
it is necessary to reflect back, "in a thorough historical and critical 
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fashion," in order to provide for a radical self-understanding such 
that the crisis can be seen in perspective. 
Neither Gregor nor Husserl claim in these works to have provided 
a cook-book or practical guide for surviving crisis; rather, they have 
attempted to constitute exemplary responses to the crisis they iden- 
tify, and the question for us is whether we can learn from them: Are 
they examples of workable perspectives? 
II. Natural Science 
The "natural" sciences, the "hard" sciences, the "exact" sciences- 
these constitute a presence with which we must contend, it seems, 
before we can be very clear about the place of science in our own 
activities. Husserl attempts to clarify Galileo's original contribution 
to the activity we now identify as physics, in order that we may 
understand the "enigma of subjectivity" so central to the crisis of 
science. Space does not permit a complete recapitulation of the 
argument, but Husserl pays close attention to what would have oc- 
curred to Galileo as "obvious" about nature, in order to clarify the 
meaning for subjectivity (for Galileo) of Galileo's mathematization 
of nature, that crucial development for modern science. This proc- 
ess of reflecting back produces a complex insight into the invention 
of a new idea; then we are conducted through the process of the 
emptying of the meaning of mathematical natural science through 
"technization." 
Like arithmetic itself, in technically developing its methodology it is drawn 
into a process of transformation, through which it becomes a sort of tech- 
nique; ... it becomes a mere art of achieving ... according to technical rules, 
results the genuine sense of whose truth can be attained only by concretely 
intuitive thinking actually directed at the subject matter itself. But now 
only those modes of thought ... which are indispensable for a technique as 
such, are in action. 
The original thinking that gives meaning and truth to the correct 
results is excluded. (Husserl does not think the process unneces- 
sary or illegitimate, but that it must be a method practiced in "a 
fully conscious way." Even more, "it must be freed of the charac- 
ter of an unquestioned tradition.. .") 
The foregoing (and a great deal more) leads to this formulation 
of the problem: 
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Are science and its method not like a machine, reliable in accomplishing 
very useful things, a machine everyone can learn to operate correctly with- 
out in the least understanding the inner possibility and necessity of this sort 
of accomplishment? But was geometry, was science, capable of being de- 
signed in advance, like a machine, without an understanding which was, in 
a similar sense, complete- scientific? 
There are "criticisms" aplenty of science today, but most of them 
are merelv anti-science arguments not actually intended to produce 
understanding. To the extent that Gregor deals with natural sci- 
ence at all it is in resnonse to such anti-science "criticisms." Unfor- 
tunately, Gregor deals mostly with straw men-hasty, often pre- 
posterouis characterizations of some "position"-which he proceeds 
to destroy with equally bad arguments. (He does try to respond 
to Thomas Kuhn's argument, but since he fails adequately to recon- 
struct Kuhn's position, he ends up with the foolish charge that 
"Kuhn's indisposition to make the necessary distinction between 
the logic of discovery [sic] ... and the normative and prescriptive 
logic of justification thwarts analysis and confuses issues.") In- 
evitably, the failure to appreciate the crisis of science as such pro- 
duces a politicized response in those who experience, nevertheless, 
the loss of meaning which characterizes the crisis. The almost fre- 
netic verbosity of Gregor's book, the contentiousness, the attacks on 
unnamed, "pernicious" mystics, and the regrettable omissions from 
consideration of relevant. contemporary works and approaches (e.g., 
Wolin on "methodism," Gunnell on "contextualism," phenomenol- 
ogy, ethnomethodology, and the like) are all symptoms of politiciza- 
tion. Indeed, Gregor's book often sounds like (and makes about 
as much sense as) a campaign speech: 
We do know a great deal more about man's political life and his political 
behavior today than we did a generation ago. Our future success will be 
contingent on our ability to effectively employ the corrigible methods of 
contemporary science, on our ability to refine those methods, and on our 
capacity to more cognitively assess our needs, aspirations, and conflicting 
desires.... There are no magic formulas nor guarantees of success. There 
is only the prospect of hard and collaborative nterprise. 
III. The Politics of Knowledlge 
Arnold Brecht argues that the "real crisis" in Western scientific 
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theory occurred in the rise of the theoretical opinion that no scien- 
tific choice between ultimate values can be made. But I think that 
a proper reading of Husserrs Crisis shows that Brecht's position 
(which easily subsumes Gregor's) is at least in part the result of 
methodological error. As we saw above, Husserl identified the 
crisis of science as its loss of meaning; but he did not proceed to 
erect this observation into a methodological position, superstitiously 
granting to a "science" (the intuitive meaning of which was, for 
technical reasons, virtually impossible to apprehend) the status of 
"objective knowledge" in contradistinction to his own "mere sub- 
jectivity." Instead he attempts to clarify what is for functioning sub- 
jectivity a critical enigma-whether that subject is a "scientist" or 
not. 
The bulk of the Crists is a pursuit of the complex methodological 
arguments which must be clarified at every step in the course of 
reconstructing the meaning of science by Husserl's method. If it 
were only for the intellectual exhilaration the book affords, it would 
be, as they say, must reading for the methodologist. But it is more 
than this. I think; many methodologists will probably find that the 
Crisis makes possible for them thoughts and conversations which 
would not have occurred without reading it. 
Much of what will be talked about and thought about--partly 
(though by no means exclusively) as a result of Husserl's impact 
on methodology-during this period of crisis in the study of politics 
will be indistinguishable from philosophy, or political theory. The 
more often we find science to be the object of political contention, 
the more often do we find it necessary to "reflect back ... to pro- 
vide. . . before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding: ... 
into what was . . . always sought in philosophy ... and which, once 
seen, apodictically conquers the will." 
Even though Husserl never uses the word "politics" in the Crisis, 
it is a book eminently well suited to introduce the student of politics 
to the most critical problems of the discipline. And from the per- 
spective thus afforded, Gregor's book will appear as a symptom of 
the crisis of science, rather than a meaningful response to the crisis 
of political science. 
RODERICK BELL, The University of Texas at Austin 
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